April – May this year, NOAS conducted a two week fact-finding mission to Northern Iraq. This report contains our conclusions in regard to the general safety situation in the area and for specific groups.

Table of Contents

Preface

Summary and conclusion

Political background

Social and economic situation

Internal displacement
1. The «Anfal» operation
2. Kirkuk
3. Internal conflicts
4. Iran

The general safety situation
1. Internal: The relation between the KDP and the PUK
2. External: The regime in Baghdad
3. The neighbouring states
4. The Refugee Convention of 1951

Exposed groups
1. Persons and groups that risk persecution from militant Islamists
2. Clan and political loyalty
3. The internal conflict between the KDP and the PUK
4. Communists
5. Women
6. Iranian and Iraqi oppositionals

Protection in Northern Iraq for displaced persons and groups

“Visits” in Northern Iraq

The position of the de facto-authorities in regard to the return of refugees from Europe

The asylum assessment in Norway

Preface

In co-operation with the Norwegian Refugee Council, NOAS undertook a two week fact-finding mission to Northern Iraq between April 21 and May 5 2001. The trip was divided equally between the two capitals within the self-governed Kurdish areas. The first week we were stationed in Sulaymaniah, which is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), while for the second week we were based in Erbil, which is controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

The aim of the trip was to gather information, on particularly exposed groups, in Northern Iraq along with the overall security situation there. We travelled extensively and visited most areas of Northern Iraq; in addition to the capitals of the de facto-authorities we visited among other places Diana, Dahuk and Amedi. We met with representatives of the KDP and the PUK, as well as the de facto-authorities in their respective areas. We also met with representatives of other political parties; The Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party, The Assyrian Association (Christians). We visited several camps for internally displaced persons in and around Sulaymaniah and Erbil. We placed emphasis on gathering information both from the political level, from organisations and from ordinary people.

Summary and conclusion

The people in Northern Iraq still live in constant fear of a new invasion by Saddam Hussein, and also the danger of a breakdown in the truce between the PUK and the KDP. The experiences that people have had with human rights violations by the regime in Baghdad, and the party rivalry in the Kurdish autonomous zone, have led to the people of this area fleeing and seeking refuge abroad.

It is Saddam Hussein’s goal to regain control over Northern Iraq. In contrast to the wishes of the UN and the de facto-authorities, the regime in Baghdad is opposed to the idea that Northern Iraq should have an autonomous status within a federal Iraq. Co-operation between the PUK and the KDP is yet to materialise. So far, there have been no developments to indicate that the risk of new conflicts has diminished. Therefore, since, in reality, the dangers are equally high at present, as they have been in the past ten years, NOAS is still firmly of the opinion that it is premature to declare this area safe.

In accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951, the absence of national protection is a necessary precondition for international protection. The de facto-authorities in Northern Iraq have no internationally recognised sovereignty over their territory. National protection in Iraq is, by definition, protection from the Iraqi national government. The people in northern Iraq undoubtedly lack national protection in view of the fact that the regime in Baghdad persecutes the Kurdish minority in much the same way as other ethnic and political groups in Iraq. Refugees from Northern Iraq have as such, a legitimate right to international protection.

The point of view of the Norwegian authorities is that the return of rejected asylum seekers to Northern Iraq is sustainable. This is claimed with reference to the UNHCR. The UNHCR states, in its position document of June 1999, regarding Iraqi refugees “…it is essential that each claim be assessed in light not only of its particular circumstances, but also in light of the situation in the enclave at the time the determination is made.”

In NOAS’s experience, the various categories of persecution described during asylum interviews among Kurdish asylum seekers in Norway, actually takes place in Northern Iraq: Persecutions of persons who one way or the other represent a threat to those in power, be it the PUK, the KDP or Islamists. A policy that does not recognise persecution from, for example, Islamists, would be contrary to the practice at UNHCR’s Damascus office. Persecution by Islamists is the most important reason for the protection granted by this bureau.

The de facto-authorities do not have the control necessary to guarantee lawful protection for its citizens. Persons and groups can risk persecution by people other than those in authority, without any intervention by the authorities, either in the form of sanctions or protection.

Interviews of this group were conducted at a period of time, when both the police and applicants, were under the conviction that Iraqi asylum seekers would be granted residence in Norway. A justifiable consideration of the individual’s need for protection should presuppose a new assessment of asylum applications, as our experience shows that the quality of these interviews does not meet the requirements of a reasonably justified evaluation.

In addition to our insistence that Iraqi asylum seekers still have a general need for protection, based on the aforementioned reasons, in the following we would like to highlight important factors in assessing individual asylum seekers from Northern Iraq.

Political background

Kurds in Northern Iraq staged an armed rebellion against the regime in Baghdad in the periods of 1960-75, 1983-88 and after 1991. In 1991, the two opposing Kurdish parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) took control over the northernmost provinces. The PUK currently controls the largest part of the Sulaymaniah region (with the exception of the Halabja area, which is ruled by Islamists supported by Iran, and the area bordering with Iran, which is controlled by the PKK (Turkish-Kurdish guerrilla)). The KDP controls the regions Erbril, Dahuk and Zacho. Turkish military forces are based at several places in the areas controlled by the KDP, among others Erbil.

Social and economic situation

The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iraq in 1990. I 1997, the Security Council’s resolution 986 (“Oil for food”) was implemented. 13 percent of income from sanctioned oil exports is supposed to be used for humanitarian purposes in Northern Iraq. The “Oil for food” programme in Northern Iraq is administered by the UN. In the government controlled areas the UN only plays an observer’s role.

Since 1996, this programme has led to the allocation of monthly food rations to the inhabitants of Northern Iraq. In addition, the UN administers the distribution of medicine and medical equipment. According to UN reports, the Oil for food programme has brought an end to the deteriorated humanitarian situation that arose in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of imposed sanctions. This was in contrast to the government controlled areas, which experienced a worsened situation in 1999.

According to the sanction-regime, neither food rations nor medical equipment employed under the Oil for food programme are to be purchased in Iraq. Resources are to be used solely for reconstructive and not for developmental purposes. Furthermore, the resources should not be utilised as means of payment to persons employed by the Northern Iraqi de facto-authorities. The principles pertaining to the “Oil for food” programme, in conformity with the sanction-regime, are negotiated every sixth month. The negotiating parties are the Iraqi government and the UN. In other words, the Baghdad government has to approve arrangements regarding Northern Iraq.

The Oil for food programme has made it possible for Northern Iraq to benefit from the income from the country’s sanctioned oil exports, thereby securing a minimum of food and medicine for its people. It has also led to a reduction in petty crimes (theft, etc.). However, the sanctions have certain adverse effects on the economy. Although there is no industrial development, agricultural ventures (the most important industry in Northern Iraq) are impeded due to the allotment of food rations. Moreover, locally produced food can neither be exported or be part of UN food rations. Purchasing power is extremely low which has a negative effect on the economy.

The most important source of income in today’s Northern Iraq is trade, customs duty, and smuggling of goods. The border with Turkey at the customs station Ibrahim Khalil, is the largest contributor to this income. This however implies that, the KDP, which controls Iraq’s border with Turkey, has access to a far lager size of income than the PUK.

The Baath regime in Baghdad during its period of rule opposed the exploitation of natural resources and economic development in Northern Iraq. With the exception of oil exploration in the Kirkuk area, the Baath regime refused to enhance industrial development in the north. A general belief among people is that the UN is in effect, continuing this policy further on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime.

The difficult economic situation has lead to a strengthened system of patronage. Those in power (the PUK and the KDP) secure financial and political control by distributing the limited resources to persons who are loyal to them.

There are negotiations in progress to use Syria as a corridor for trade between Iraq and Turkey, a process that would lead to a drastic reduction in income in the areas controlled by the Kurdish parties. Furthermore, if Saddam Hussein acts in accordance with UN demands, the sanctions would be lifted and consequently the Oil for food programme ended. Northern Iraq would lose its 13% of the oil sales. The allocation of food rations and medical aid would also be terminated, while reconstruction projects in progress under the administration of the UN would have to be suspended. This could lead to an undermining if an already weak economy, which in turn could lead to the political destabilisation of Northern Iraq.

Internal displacement

There are various categories of internal displacement of people in Northern Iraq, the majority of whom live in camps in and around cities.

1. The «Anfal» operation

In 1985 the government in Baghdad began the extinction of 4500 of 5000 villages in northern Iraq. A strategy devised to gain control over the populace. In the course of the so-called Attack Action, 182 000 people disappeared while the remainder were placed in camps.

2. Kirkuk

The government in Baghdad is implementing a policy of arablisation in the Kirkuk area. Kirkuk is located in the government-controlled zone near the border with the Kurdish controlled area. The area around Kirkuk is rich in oil resources and traditionally, the majority of the people in this area have been Kurds. However since 1991, over 200 000 Kurds have been driven out of this area into areas under Kurdish control. Internally displaced people among this group are also placed in camps. This phenomenon of internal displacement is a constant reminder for the people of Northern Iraq about Saddam Hussein’s cruel treatment of national minorities.

3. Internal conflicts

Politically active personalities in the KDP were forced to leave the PUK areas and vice versa during the period of internal conflicts between 1994-1997. Since then it has been impossible for them to return to their hometowns.

4. Iran

Approximately 60 000 Kurds from Northern Iraq who fled to Iran at the beginning of the 70s have returned, primarily to the KDP controlled areas, in the last couple of years.

The general safety situation

Among the various persons, parties and groups that we had contact with in Northern Iraq, there was a general concern that the safety situation in Northern Iraq has not significantly changed since 1991. As long as the future status for Northern Iraq remains undefined, and threats against its people remain, the people will continue to flee from this area and seek refuge in safer countries.

Various internal and external relations determine the safety of the people of Northern Iraq: The relations between the PUK and the KDP, the regime in Baghdad, and the neighbouring states Turkey, Iran and Syria. Finally, USA’s political policy in the region also plays a significant role. What is rather special, and perhaps unique, about the situation is that the area at present appears to be relatively calm There are however, several factors which at any time might again submerge the area into chaos. The safety situation is constantly threatened by the internal tensions between the two Kurdish parties the PUK and the KDP, which were at war with each other three times in the 1990s, and by the danger of a new invasion by the regime in Baghdad.

1. Internal: The relation between the KDP and the PUK

After the peace accord in December 1998, there has not been any substantial fighting between the KDP and the PUK. The peace negotiations following the accord have mainly been concerned with the distribution of resources between the two parties/areas. The most important source of income in Northern Iraq today, is custom duty from the border with Turkey at Ibrahim Khalil (KDP-territory). The division of this income played an important role in the conflict between the two parties in the period of 1994-1997. Pressure, from among others the USA, has resulted in a written principal agreement for the division of this income.

There are plans underway to elect a common parliament and government in the course of the year 2001. During the initial stage only individual ministries would be under the joint administration of the PUK and the KDP, for instance, the ministry for health, education and justice. At present, the plan to establish party offices in each other’s respective areas has not been implemented. There is a very limited, if any exchange of newspapers between the two areas, while repatriation of refugees from the internal conflict is not yet in process.

2. External: The regime in Baghdad

The UN does not wish to recognise Northern Iraq as an independent state. The UN’s wish is for Northern Iraq to become an autonomous state within a federal Iraq. The Kurdish de facto-authorities accept the UN’s plan whereas the government in Baghdad strongly opposes it.

Saddam Hussein’s forces could take control of large parts of Northern Iraq in a very short time. Iraqi forces are at any given time located only a few hours outside of Sulaymaniah. During the time that has passed since the Gulf War the Government has strengthened its military capabilities. The smuggling of oil out of Iraq represents earnings equal to that of the Oil for food program. In total, Iraq sells as much oil now as prior to the imposition of sanctions. As a result, Saddam Hussein has probably regained much of his military strength. Therefore, Kurds in Northern Iraq are convinced that as long as the current regime retains power in Baghdad, the threat of persecution and invasion remains a very real one. IFFY

However, the regime in Bagdad wants the lifting of sanctions and may not be willing to risk falling further foul of the UN, by invading Northern Iraq. On the other hand, it also appears that Saddam Hussein has a certain interest of the sanctions continuing: The Irqai population is more easily kept under control and Iraq receives sympathy from neighbouring Arab states.

3. The neighbouring states

Like the regime in Baghdad, the neighbouring states also do not wish for a unification of Kurds in Northern Iraq, seeing it as a threat to their national interests. They may therefore be expected, to do what they can in an attempt to prevent this unification. Through the influence they have on Turkey, the United States may be able to influence Turkish policy vis-à-vis Northern Iraq. However, as of today it is not clear what will be the policy of the new US administration towards to Northern Iraq.

The future political status of Northern Iraq remains unclear. Today no guarantees exist that the United States and Great Britain will continue their surveillance and protection of the air space over Northern Iraq. Lately the number of flyovers has also been reduced. The reason for this is apparently fears for the safety of the pilots, but is probably just as much motivated by political concerns.

4. The Refugee Convention of 1951

The de facto-authorities in Northern Iraq have gained no international recognition of their sovereignty over their territories. They do not constitute national authorities and hence are unable to render the national protection that the UN Convention predicates as the natural alternative to international protection.

The 1951 Convention upholds the principle that those who cannot enjoy national protection against persecution have the right to international protection. As in the case of any non-national government, any protection that the KDP and the PUK may grant would be unstable, as their own positions are unstable and future situations cannot be predicted. It is a fact that de facto-authorities of this kind (as in the case of Northern Iraq), usually, are not democratically elected. Rather, they represent a form of government, that is scarcely regulated by law, that employs illegal methods of governing, and which is often associated with both planned, and random persecution.

At the same time, it is without doubt that the people of Northern Iraq lack the national protection that the 1951 Convention is based on, since it is evident that Iraqi authorities in Baghdad persecute the Kurdish minority together with other ethnic and political groups in Iraq. Refugees from Iraq therefore, in line with the convention, have a legitimate right to international protection.

Exposed groups

1. Persons and groups that risk persecution from militant Islamists

There are a number of different Islamic groups in Northern Iraq, both militant and moderate, with diverse political agendas. The most important group of Islamists controls the Halabja region along the border with Iran. This area has approximately 150 000 inhabitants. Islamists outside of the Halabja area have been less influential after the peace accord between the KDP and the PUK. Islamists however, continue to carry out attacks on individuals declared political opponents: politicians, journalists, and intellectuals. Persons who represent a threat to the Islamists by directly criticising their activities are often targets. Islamists murdered the journalist Hawzhin, who worked for the newspapers Hawlaty and Rozhnama Nooz in Sulaymaniah, last year after criticising the activities of the Islamists. According to the UNHCR in Damascus, individuals without any political profile also risk being persecuted if they challenge or act contrary to the requirements of social norms and conventions. For example women who wilfully oppose arranged marriages. Any breach in upholding these social conventions is strictly sanctioned in the communities (family, clans or parties) that belong to militant Islamic parties. Militant Islamists have a certain degree of political influence in areas outside their nucleus of Halabja as well. They have been suspected of masterminding various terrorist activities in areas like Erbil and Sulaymaniah.

2. Clan and political loyalty

Political loyalty is primarily connected to the clan or family. One’s loyalty to a political party is basically determined by the clan’s political loyalty. A clan’s party loyalty can be changed. This implies that whereas clan loyalty is permanent party loyalty can be changed. If a clan or family challenges its party by transferring its loyalty to a competitor or loses its membership (in practice its protection) in a party, the clan or family will be forced to flee to the territory of the rival party and seek protection there.

Conflicts between persons and families that arise without any initial political element, can develop into political persecution if political influence is employed to carry out the persecution. Feuds between clans can arise due to various factors: property conflicts, murder etc. As a consequence, it might be difficult in some cases to draw a distinction between crime and persecution.

3. The internal conflict between the KDP and the PUK

Before the peace accord, people who belonged to the rival party in the conflict between the KDP and the PUK were driven from their areas of residence. Expulsion of political opponents has decreased since the peace accord in December 1998. However, it is still not possible for people who were internally displaced during the PUK-KDP conflict to return to their homes. Their homes might be inhabited by other internally displaced people. Travelling between the two areas of conflict is now possible though limited. Meanwhile, politically profiled persons refrain from this for fear of reprisals, or becoming targets of suspicion even by their own parties. There are frequent occurrences of acts of vengeance by families of murder victims against persons suspected to have committed these atrocities. This primarily applies to persons who are known to have committed war crimes (murdered prisoners or civilians) or carried out assassinations. Defectors from the KDP and the PUK could encounter problems if they happen to be in possession of sensitive information, political, military or otherwise. Should the PUK and the KDP co-operate at some point, persons who fled either of these areas to the other would risk losing their protection. The danger of this is very much dependent on the person’s/family’s background.

4. Communists

There are several communist parties in Northern Iraq. The largest is the Iraqi Kurdistans Communist Party (IKCP). The IKCP has existed since the 1930s and is represented in the governments of both the PUK and the KDP controlled areas. They are not represented in the parliament in Erbil and Sulaymaniah. The Iraqi Communist Worker’s Party is a minor communist party, which absorbed several minor communist parties after the riot in 1991. In June 2000, this party was banned in the PUK area. This was after the PUK authorities in Sulaymaniah refused to let them operate with their own militia. A demonstration resulted in the deaths of six people during fire exchanges. The party also fell into disfavour because they were blamed for perpetrating a number of armed actions in Iran, in collaboration with Iranian communists. Members of the party were driven to Erbil. Some of them are still in Erbil while others have fled abroad.

5. Women

Honour killings are a problem in Northern Iraq as in other countries in the region. However, the extent of the problem has increased in Northern Iraq during the last 10-15 years. There are several reasons for this. Several thousand villages were destroyed in the 1980s, a consequence of which was a social collapse. After 1991 Northern Iraq has been characterised by a lack of legal protection and general impunity. The conflicts between the rival parties has led to political interests being prioritised at the expense of legal principles. The de facto-authorities’ lack of interest in preventing honour killings reflects womens complete lack of power in society. There is no certain data as to the extent of this phenomenon, but according to women’s organisations in Northern Iraq 4000 honour killings after 1991 is a conservative estimate.

6. Iranian and Iraqi oppositionals

Several thousand Iranian and Iraqi (from government controlled area) refugees have taken refuge in Northern Iraq. Because of the presence both of Iranian and Iraqi intelligence services in Northern Iraq, they are often in need of protection. The UNHCR actively resettles persons within these groups to safe third countries.

Protection in Northern Iraq for displaced persons and groups

The risk of persecution, for the aforementioned groups, is often determined by their access to protection from persons, groups or parties with power and influence. For example, persons persecuted by Islamists would be more vulnerable if they had no protection by the PUK or the KDP. As a consequence of the increased co-operation between the PUK and the KDP clans/families that have previously changed their party affiliation risk losing their protection. Indeed, the fact that the Governor of Erbil was recently killed in an assassination goes to show that anyone with a political profile can be exposed. It is still not known who carried out the assassination.

“Visits” in Northern Iraq

During 2000, 1440 persons are said to have crossed the border between Northern Iraq and Syria with Norwegian travel documents. This is not necessarily an indication that the area is safe for return. Firstly, it is clear that there are many that have not made such visits to Northern Iraq. The fact that some go back because they do not have an individual need of protection and therefor safely may do so, does in no way imply that others do not have an individual need of protection. Secondly, the greatest argument against return is instability in the current political situation. It is impossible to know, or even assume, with any certainty what the situation will be one – three – six months from now. That some may now travel safely to Northern Iraq and stay there for limited periods in certain areas does not imply that they would be safe if they are still there three months from now. Also, it cannot be ruled out that a considerable portion of the border crossings are carried out by persons originating from the government controlled area, who stay in the Kurdish controlled area only for brief periods of time while visiting their families.

The position of the de facto-authorities in regard to the return of refugees from Europe

All the government representatives we were in touch with were very explicit in regard to the question of return. They all state that they do not want any forced return of refugees from Europe. This is because they have enough problems assisting the already existing groups of refugees and internally displaced persons. They also emphasise the social problems it would entail taking back persons who often had to sell all of their possessions in order to afford the ticket to Europe.

At the same time both politicians and ordinary people in Northern Iraq, were clear on the point, that those who flee, do so because of the long standing uncertainty and fear of the future, not of economic reasons. Therefore there is little basis for believing that many of the Kurds will return voluntarily, as seems to be the objective of the Norwegian authorities.

The asylum assessment in Norway

In their position document of June 1999 the UNHCR writes that “there may be certain cases for which the possibility to remain in, or return to, northern Iraq safely cannot be ruled out”. In other words, the UNHCR does indeed open up for returns, but it remains a question to be considered, whether the wording “in certain cases” and “cannot be ruled out” that return can take place, can encompass virtually all asylum seekers within this group, as is the case in Norway.

The interviews with the individual asylum seekers were conducted at a time when all Iraqi asylum seekers were granted residence permits. This was knowledge shared by the asylum seekers themselves, and by the police who conducted the interviews. As a consequence many of the interviews are brief and undetailed; they are often incomplete – regularly only half as long as ordinary asylum interviews, and there is a consistent lack of follow up questions from the Police. One may argue that the asylum seekers have signed the interviews and therefor accepted them as representative. However, the police officials have also signed the interviews that are incomplete. Indeed, one has to ask whether the responsibility placed on the authorities by the Administrative Law (Fovaltningsloven) that every case be sufficiently researched has here been fulfilled.

Another important element that has been debated, is the fact that during the spring of 2000, the UDI processed approximately 2000 asylum applications from Iraqi Kurds, within no more than 2-3 months. As a consequence of such a hasty case assessment, the decisions mostly consist of general considerations, regularly without reference for instance to scars after torture or other elements of importance to the case in question. It is difficult to see that this is in conformity with the precondition stated by the UNHCR that cases must be given a thorough and individual assessment. Many of the cases that NOAS has examined give the impression that the UDI rejected only on formal and superficial criteria, without looking into the particulars of the individual cases. In cases where the UDI puts forward a more extensive line of argument in their decisions, hence giving the impression of a more thorough assessment, unfortunately it seems that the thoroughness mainly consists in finding a basis for questioning the asylum seeker’s credibility. In this way trivialities and insignificant ambiguities in an asylum interview can easily lead to comprehensive and highly credible accounts being ignored. This is executed in a way that demonstrates an obvious lack of insight into the political and social situation in Northern Iraq. NOAS is highly concerned that this practice will not be rectified, but rather copied in the second instance by the Immigration Appeals Board.

Oslo June 7 2001